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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two chapters. The unifying theme across them is how govern-
ment policy affects the allocation of resources in an economy, both at the micro and macro
level.
The first chapter analyzes the effects of city-level zoning reforms on the spatial distribution
of economic activity in a metropolitan area. Using parcel-level property tax and zoning data,
I use Minneapolis recent reform, which eliminated single-family zoning lots, to estimate
productivity gains in the local housing development sector. I feed the estimated productivity
gain into a quantitative spatial model of the Twin Cities, the metropolitan area which
Minneapolis is a part of, to compute the effect of the reform on local wages, rents and
commuting patterns.
The second chapter, in turn, develops a general equilibrium model with sectoral linkages
in which firms face borrowing constraints that can be alleviated by government subsidies.
I use it to evaluate how the Brazilian government’s policy to direct subsidized credit to
specific sectors, called earmarked loans, impacts output per worker through two channels.
The first one is the general equilibrium effect of alleviating the borrowing constraint of a
sector, increasing output. The second channel works in the other direction. In order to raise
funds to subsidize loans, the government needs to tax labor and hence distorts households’
consumption–labor supply decisions. Whether the first effect dominates the second depends
on how relevant the subsidized sector is in the economy’s production network structure. I
calibrate the model using Brazilian data to study the federal government’s decision to
increase subsidies for specific sectors in the credit market, perform optimal policy analysis,
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Chapter 1
Housing Supply Constraints and
the Distribution of Economic
Activity: The Case of the Twin
Cities
1.1 Introduction
This chapter investigates general equilibrium effects across a metropolitan area when one
of its cities implements a zoning reform that allows for more population density. Previous
studies have shed light on the potential benefits for cities in the United States to allow
more housing development when they face housing supply constraints due to zoning or
other regulations. Allowing more development is expected to lower the cost of housing,
attracting new residents, which in turn increases the city’s workforce and output. What is
usually not emphasized by the current literature is that cities in the same urban area will
also be affected by the zoning reform. Here, I use theory and data on the recent zoning
reform that took place in Minneapolis, MN, to quantify how the distribution of population,
workplace, wages and rents rates across Twin Cities metropolitan area are impacted by the
reform.
To investigate first and second order effects of a local zoning reform, I develop a quanti-
tative spatial model of a metropolitan area. Since housing in each location are subject to
different regulatory constraints, development costs vary by location. In addition, workers
are exposed to location preference shocks with respect to where they want to live and work,
as well as commuting cost between their residence and workplace locations. I also introduce
agglomeration effects and decreasing returns to scale in the production of the consumption
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good.
One of the main contributions of this chapter is to develop a methodology to infer pro-
ductivity losses from zoning laws. I model the reform as a shifter in productivity of the
housing sector. This interpretation is similar to how one can interpret changes in total fac-
tor productivity in business cycle models as changes in capacity utilization. This approach
is similar to the ones found in Glaeser et al. (2005) and Herkenhoff et al. (2018), and is
based on the empirical evidence such as in Albouy and Ehrlich (2018) that stricter zoning
regulations inhibiting development in an area translate to higher housing costs. By allowing
more population density, the reform reduces the cost of housing per unit. This is equivalent
to a decrease in the marginal cost of producing housing in a location, which drives down
rents.
Lower rental rates attract new residents, which move out of other locations in the metropoli-
tan area. When they do so, due to commuting costs, this gives rise to changes in commuting
patterns across the metropolitan area after the zoning reform. Not only the city experiences
an influx of residents, but its share of workers with respect to the metropolitan area also
increases. Since other locations in the metro area lose workers and residents, rents tend to
fall in those locations and wages rise, since labor demand is downward-sloping.
I focus on the recent zoning reform that eliminated single-family housing in the city of
Minneapolis and its larger impact on the Twin Cities metropolitan area. While Minneapolis
is the economic center of the metro area, its population is only about ten percent of the
total. Moreover, roughly twenty percent of the jobs in the Twin Cities are located in the
city. Until 2019, around seventy percent of the city’s residential lots were zoned as single-
family units. Starting in 2020, every parcel in the city of Minneapolis admits at least three
dwelling units. No the other city inside the metro area thus far has introduced a similar
plan for housing reform. Because it took place recently, its effects will take some years to
appear in the data. Therefore, the use of a quantitative spatial model is more suited to
analyze this problem than more usual microeconometric tools in urban economics.
With the model, I back out housing productivities at the level of the Census tract before the
zoning reform. These measures of housing productivity are consistent with rents imputed
from data on parcel-level property values. In the model, given land and materials demanded
by the housing sector, lower productivity increases the cost of supplying housing. Therefore,
rezoning a location by allowing more density is equivalent to increasing the developer’s
productivity in that same location. Since the reform affected all the locations previously
zoned as single-family in Minneapolis, productivity increases in the housing sector in many
parts of the city.
To discipline this increase, I combine these measures with zoning data available at the
parcel level for Minneapolis. The objective of the exercise is to quantify by how much the
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productivity of the housing sector changes after the restriction on single-family units is lifted
across the city. I project the estimated housing productivity prior to the zoning reform on
each tract’s share of lots zoned as single-family units, as well as the tract’s distance to
the city’s downtown area. Because these regressors don’t vary due to endogenous choices
made by the agents in the model and in the data, they are exogenous and thus can be used
to inform how housing productivity will change in each location. I find that the median
productivity growth is about 9 percent at the tract level.
To quantitatively assess the impact of the zoning reform, I feed the model with the coun-
terfactual productivities and compute the new general equilibrium in the urban area. I find
that the upzoning is expected to decrease the cost of housing in Minneapolis by about twenty
percent, even with the additional influx of residents from other cities in the metropolitan
area. Rents in most other tracts in the metro area also fall, given that part of their local
population moves out to Minneapolis. The model also predicts that the policy should at-
tract new residents and workforce to the city by five and two percent, respectively. Most of
the new jobs are created in Downtown Minneapolis, which also draws workers from other
tracts in the city. Because there are fewer workers in the tracts farther from the city center,
downward-sloping labor demand causes wages in those locations rise. Aggregated at the
city level, wages in Minneapolis fall by almost one percent.
In addition, the model predicts the second-order effects of the policy coming form the real-
location of the workforce inside the metropolitan area. Workers that move to Minneapolis
come from suburban parts of the metropolitan area. Minneapolis is located in the center of
the Twin Cities. This implies that the reform generates higher density in the center of the
metropolitan area. Higher density is not exclusive to Minneapolis. Other tracts adjacent to
Minneapolis also experience population growth. Driving this result is both the increase in
wages in these locations outside Minneapolis, as well as the lower costs of commuting costs
from these counties to the city.
The results described above highlight the importance of looking at zoning reforms in a
broader context outside the city in which it takes place. Because individuals don’t need
to live and work in the same location, making housing more affordable in one location can
have impacts on cities in a commuting distance to it. It also shows how heterogeneous the
impacts can be across the metropolitan area.
Many cities in the United States zone most of their residential areas as single-family detached
houses. They account for seventy five percent of the residential land in Los Angeles, CA;
and seventy nine percent in Chicago, IL, for example. This restriction on development
can impact by how much a city can attract new workers, while at the same time driving
up housing costs and increasing commuting times from home to work. Many local and
state governments have been pushing for zoning reforms that allow more densely packed
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buildings to increase housing affordability and attract new workers. In recent years, besides
Minneapolis, cities such as Seattle and Portland have introduced or passed bills in an effort
to reduce or eliminate neighborhoods exclusively zoned as single-family housing. The effects
of such policies on neighboring cities is often left out ot the debate. Although the potential
gains from upzoning may seem obvious for the city that implements the policy, less clear are
the second-order effects that come from population reallocation across an urban area. This
chapter contributes to the zoning reform literature by highlighting such general equilibrium
effects.
This chapter does not deal directly with the potential distributional conflicts that may
arise between renters and homeowners. Zoning rules exist in the real world sometimes for
reasons that are not internalized in the model. For instance, homeowners may use zoning
to intentionally reduce density around where they live, or to force higher sorting through
income in their neighborhoods. They may also want to use their properties as a source of
financial investment. In such case, an increase in house prices and rents due to land-use
regulations is beneficial to homeowners. My model is silent about these features of the real
world, choosing instead to focus on the spatial and labor market implications of the policy.
Related Literature This chapter dialogues with both the literature on quantitative spa-
tial economics and the one on the impact of zoning regulations on spatial misallocation of
workers.
The field of quantitative spatial economics has been growing in the past decades, beginning
with papers such as Lucas and Rossi–Hansberg (2002) and more recently synthesized in
Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017). Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
develop a quantitative model of a city building upon international trade models such as
Eaton and Kortum (2002). They use the exogenous variation at the city block level of
the division and reunification of Berlin to estimate and quantify the agglomeration and
dispersion forces present inside a city. Tsivanidis (2020) evaluates the impact of the intro-
duction of a faster public transportation network in a city. Heblich et al. (2020) use data
on bilateral commuting flows to inform a quantitative spatial model where commuting costs
change due to the introduction of passenger steam railways in 19th century London. These
papers highlight the importance of separation between workplace and residence locations
for workers inside modern metropolitan areas and the general equilibrium effects of changes
in commuting costs across locations. Contrary to these papers, mine focus on changes in
housing development costs and their general equilibrium effects.
Owens III et al. (2020) studies the urban structure of Detroit using a model with residen-
tial externalities can generate multiple equilibria at the neighborhood level. They include
neighborhood-specific fixed costs in housing development to allow for empty neighborhoods
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in equilibrium when few residents want to live there. Differently from this chapter, their
model features a housing cap per neighborhood. While the paper analyzes the interaction
between developer incentives and residents location preferences on the distribution of De-
troit economic activity, it doesn’t focus on zoning reforms. Couture et al. (2019) find that
the rise in income among the rich increased demand for luxury amenities in cities, driving
housing prices up in downtown areas, pricing out many low-wage workers.
The literature of land-use regulations and economics activity was recently surveyed by
Glaeser and Gyourko (2018). At the city level, Kulka (2020) studies the effect of minimum
lot sizes on household sorting by income. The paper quantifies the welfare effects of reducing
minimum lot sizes using data from Wake County in North Carolina. The paper finds
that decreasing minimum lot sizes in rich neighborhoods brings in lower-income workers.
Households with at least the area’s median income benefit from the policy. This chapter, in
contrast, focuses on zoning reforms that change the number of units that can be developed
by lot, and considers the effects of the reform on seven counties in the metropolitan area.
Parkhomenko (2019) and Khan (2020) study the consequences of decentralized control over
land use regulations. Both papers find welfare gains in centralizing land-use regulations in
higher levels of government instead of allowing them to be chosen locally. My contribution
to this literature is the study of general equilibrium effects of zoning reforms across a
metropolitan area.
At the national level, several papers study the role of housing supply constraints in the
allocation of economic activity across space. Ganong and Shoag (2017) looks at income
convergence across regions in the United States. They introduce nonhomotheticity in hous-
ing demand to capture higher housing expenditures among lower income households. They
show that increases in housing supply regulations were an important factor to explain why
lower wage workers are not moving to high-income places as much as they did three decades
ago. Herkenhoff et al. (2018) and Hsieh and Moretti (2019) study land-use regulations and
spatial misallocation in the United Sates. Both find negative impacts of land-use regula-
tions on the United States’ level of GDP per capita. In particular, Herkenhoff et al. (2018)
model land-use regulations in a similar way as this chapter, by interpreting housing pro-
ductivity heterogeneity as exogenous differences in land use-restriction. Fajgelbaum and
Gaubert (2018) study optimal spatial policies in the presence of local agglomeration and
congestion forces. They find that spatial sorting by skill and wage inequality in larger cities
in the U.S. is too high relative to efficient allocations. Martellini (2020) studies city-size
wage premium in the United States and how relaxing housing regulation in cities affect the
sorting of workers with different skill levels.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the Twin Cities metro area
and the zoning reform implemented in Minneapolis. Section 1.3 presents the spatial model
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Figure 1.1: Map of Minneapolis, Saint Paul and Bloomington Metropropolitan Statistical
Area
of the urban area. Section 2.5 discusses the calibration and estimation strategies used in
this chapter. The quantitative counterfactual analysis is presented in Section 1.5. Finally,
Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Twin Cities Metropolitan Area
The Minneapolis, Saint Paul and Bloomington Metropolitan Statistical Area, also known as
the Twin Cities metropolitan area, is the only MSA in the state of Minnesota. It contains a
total of seven counties in the State: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott and
Washington. The population of the metro area contains about 3.64 million people, being
the third largest population-wise in the Midwest and the 16th largest metropolitan area in
the United States.
The Twin Cities metro area gets its name from two neighboring cities that are considered to
be the most important in the metropolitan area: Minneapolis and Saint Paul. The former
is the largest and most populous city in the state, and the seat of Hennepin County, the
state’s most populous county. Outside Chicago, Minneapolis is the most densely populated
city in the Midwest. The latter is the state’s capital and located in Ramsey County, the
state’s most densely populated county. Figure 1.1 show the map of the Twin Cities metro
area, with Minneapolis and St. Paul highlighted.
Even though Minneapolis is economically the most important city in the metropolitan area,
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it is far from concentrating the majority of its population and labor market. Table 1.1
shows the population and workplace shares in the Twin Cities. Minneapolis population is
roughly ten percent of the metro area’s population, and twenty one percent of the area’s
workforce works in the city. In fact, in other counties, at least twenty three percent of
their own population work in the same county, highlighting that the economic activity in
the metropolitan area is reasonably dispersed. Still, at least ten percent of the workforce
living in each county works in Minneapolis, which suggests how important the city is for
the overall metropolitan area.
Work in Work in
Population Workforce same location Minneapolis
Anoka 12 7 31 18
Carver 3 2 27 10
Dakota 14 10 37 13
Hennepin* 28 35 57 21
Minneapolis 13 21 45 45
Ramsey 16 19 44 19
Scott 5 2 37 13
Washington 8 4 23 12
* Hennepin considers Hennepin County without Minneapolis
Table 1.1: Commuting Patterns in the Twin Cities (in %)
1.2.1 Zoning Reform in Minneapolis: the 2040 Plan
Until January 1st 2020, about seventy percent of Minneapolis’ residential zoning was com-
posed of neighborhoods zoned exclusively for single family detached homes. This meant
that each parcel could only have a house where only one family could live in, and the house
had to be surrounded by lawn, and not attached to a neighboring house. Figure 1.2 displays
in green all the city regions zoned as single-family detached units and in blue all the other
strictly residential parcels.
Starting in 2016, Minneapolis City Council proposed a twenty-year comprehensive plan to
update the city’s long-term plan for itself with respect to its urban landscape, economy and
climate impact. The plan, named Minneapolis 2040, focuses on a wide variety of topics,
such as land use, transportation, housing, public health, arts and culture. Of the interest
to this chapter is its plan to change residential zoning in the city, allowing for substantial
upzoning.
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Figure 1.2: Residential Zoning in Minneapolis up to 2019
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The plan was approved by the city council and, effective in January 1st, 2020, the city’s
zoning code changed drastically. Population density in buildings in the downtown area was
increased. Along important public transit routes, the city allowed for development of high
density units. Nevertheless, the most substantial change regards single-family zoning. All
neighborhoods until recently zoned as single family now allow for at most three dwelling
units on an individual lot. This has the potential to triple the amount of housing units in
most of the city.
An important outcome from this zoning reform will be how the economic activity, population
distribution and local labor markets will be affected in the metropolitan area. The reform
will not only affect Minneapolis, but all the surrounding cities. It is therefore important to
analyze the policy change in the context of the entire metropolitan area, no the city itself.
We can expect workers to move in to Minneapolis as a result of an increase in housing
affordability, and as a consequence more jobs in Minneapolis and locations nearby. The
next section presents an urban model that allows us to make predictions of what to expect
in the aftermath of such policy change.
1.3 Model
To quantify the general equilibrium impacts of neighborhood upzoning, I build a quanti-
tative spatial equilibrium model of a metropolitan area. There is a finite and discrete set
Ω of neighborhoods. There are four sets of agents: workers, consumption goods producers,
housing producers, and absentee land and firm owners. There are R workers in the city
who can live and work in distinct locations. They are indexed by a pair ij, where i ∈ Ω and
j ∈ Ω correspond to their workplace and residence locations, respectively. Each location
produces a homogeneous consumption good, produced by a representative firm. Housing is
developed locally as well.
Worker’s problem Worker values consumption of a single good, c, housing services, h,
exogenous neighborhood amenities, sj , and idiosyncratic preferences from living in location
j and working in i, εij . I represent commuting costs from j to i by adding a parameter
κij ≥ 1. I use a Cobb-Douglas utility function to represent the worker’s preferences over










εij subject to c+ rjh = wi
where wi is the wage in workplace i and rj is the pre-tax rental rate of a unit of housing.
I assume the worker supplies inelastically one unit of labor. Denote V̂ij ≡ Vij × εij as the
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I assume that the worker’s preference over local amenities is represented by the vector εk,






where aij is the location-specific amenity term, aij > 0 and θ > 1. Worker’s location choices
to work and live are the ones that maximize their counterfactual indirect utility.
Production in Neighborhood i Technology given by Yi = Ain
β
i , β ∈ (0, 1]. I introduce
agglomeration effects: Ai = Ain
η
i . There is a homogeneous good in the city and the
representative firm in each location behaves competitively. Because I allow for decreasing
returns to scale in production, potential profits are claimed by absentee firm owners.
Housing Sector in j There’s a representative developer that behaves competitively. Pro-





where Lj is the quantity of land, Mj is materials and Gj is local productivity of the housing
sector. The price of materials is given by ι and is homogeneous across locations. Land




φM1−φ − ιM − pjL
The price of land is derived from an ad-hoc supply function given by pj = (Hj/Lj)
ψ, ψ > 0.
Restrictions on development in each neighborhood are interpreted as changes in Gj . Land
rents from the housing sector go to absentee land owners.
1.3.1 Equilibrium
Firm’s Optimization




Appendix A.3 presents the detailed derivations of the equilibrium conditions of the model.
From the law of large numbers, the fraction of workers living in location j and working in










The equation above is a gravity equation for commuting, describing overall patterns of
workers’ workplace and location choices. It shows that the fraction of the population living
in j and working in i is increasing in the location taste shock aij , wages paid in i, and
amenities in j. Similarly, the share of workers is decreasing in costly it is to commute
between the pair ij, how high are residential taxes in j, and rent (rj). Sensitivity to these
variables depend on shape parameter θ of location taste










































Housing Demand Housing demand for residents in j commuting to i is given by






i∈Ω πi|jwi. Aggregating across working neighborhoods, we get the total housing
demand, Hdj :




Housing Supply Using the first-order condition for materials in the housing developer
problem, the zero profit condition, and the land supply equation, we get the relationship






, ψ ≡ φ× ψ.
Housing Equilibrium From the housing demand equation, the relationship between the













In each region, the amount of labor demanded for each skill has to be equal to the amount
of labor supplied. The latter is determined by the amount of workers living in each region




πi|jRj ∀i ∈ Ω.
Definition 1 Given a geography {H i}i∈Ω, the equilibrium of the model is defined by a set
of location observables such that:
1. Given the number of workers in each location, the quantity produced in each region is




2. Given wages, rents and commuting costs, the share of workers commuting from neigh-






















4. Given wages, commuting costs, outside-option utility, location preferences, and hous-




πijR, ∀j ∈ Ω.







6. Given the number of residents in each neighborhood and commuting probabilities, the





7. Given the number of workers in each location, local output and prices, firms’ first-order





1.3.2 The Effects of Changing Zoning Regulations
In this model, changes in local zoning regulations are interpreted as changes in local pro-
ductivity of the housing sector, Gj . Therefore, if a neighborhood is allowed to build more
housing units per parcel or decreases the minimum lot size of each parcel, the model captures
these changes as increases in Gj .
In the model, the mechanism works as follows. When housing productivity goes up in a
location, housing can be produced at lower marginal cost. This has the effect of lowering
rents for those already residing in location, which is equivalent to a movement along the
housing demand curve. As a consequence, residents already living in the location demand
more housing. Residential amenities may move upwards or downwards, depending on how
much rent and housing demand respond to the change.
The second-order effects of the policy change come from the general equilibrium structure
of the model. Due to lower rents in the location, residents from other locations move,
which is equivalent to a shift in the housing demand curve. As an effect, rents goes up.
The population and rent increases unequivocally increases taxes collected in the location,
making room for a higher supply of neighborhood amenities, which again reinforces the
incentives to move in. Because of commuting costs, some of the new residents change their
workplace location to work nearby. The possibility of a downward-sloping labor demand
curve if β + η < 1, wages tend to fall locally and rise in locations farther away that lost
residents and workers.
Other general equilibrium effects are also present. For instance, locations that lose workers
producing the consumption good due to the spatial reallocation of residents will observe
an increase in local wages, an unintended effect of the policy. In addition, because of
commuting costs, locations close to the one which implemented the policy may observe an
increase in population as well. These results highlight the importance of analyzing changes
in housing policies in a broader context other than the city or county that implemented
them if there are nearby regions that will be directly impacted by it.
1.4 Data and Calibration
In this section, I apply the model presented above to analyze the impact of allowing for
upzoning in the Minneapolis 2040 plan. I set up the model so that it replicates patterns of
the data on the Twin Cities before January 1st 2020, when the new zoning rule took place.
That is, the model is supposed to replicate the commuting patterns, local population and
labor force, rents and wages across the Twin Cities metro area when most of the residential
part of Minneapolis was zoned as single-family, detached, units. I then use the data on
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higher-density areas to inform the change in housing productivity we should expect to
happen when the neighborhoods are allowed to upzone.
The seven counties comprising the Twin Cities metro area contain 702 census tracts in
total. Of these tracts, 113 are in the city of Minneapolis. The objective is to use data at
the tract level on housing, population, wages, commuting patterns, property taxes, rents
and commuting costs to inform the model.
1.4.1 Mapping to Data
The main data sources used for the empirical exercise are the following. I use data on
wages, residents and workers from the Longitudinal Origin-Destination Employment Statis-
tics (LODES). They provide origin and destination data on the population of workers that
at the Census block level, as well as data on wages by brackets. I use Minnesota Geospatial
Commons’ Metro Regional Parcel Dataset, which compiles parcel-level data for all the seven
counties, as the source for zoning and rents in each Census tract. Monthly rent is calculated




1− (1 + r)−T
, r = 0.06/12, T = 20× 12
Commuting costs are calculated using IRS estimate of $0.58 cents per mile. I compute
distance across locations in miles using Google Maps. I use local, county-level property tax
rates to calibrate τj . Productivity can be obtained by inverting the model to match wages.
1.4.2 Gravity Equation
Following Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2016), I regress commuting patterns on












+ µi + µj + uij
The estimated θ was 4.4, within the bounds of the literature. For location taste shock, I






Identification of Housing Productivity Parameters
From the equilibrium conditions of the model, I can write the housing productivity pa-
rameter for every tract as proportional to MSA-wide parameters from the model, rent,
population density (residents per square mile) and the data equivalent of wj :
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Figure 1.3: Relationship Between Model-Based Housing Productivity and Population Den-
sity
Given parameters and data, I can recover Gj . Heuristically, given rents and square mileage,
a higher number of residents imply that housing can be built at a lower marginal cost,
suggesting higher productivity of the housing sector. Similarly, given wages and population
density, a higher value for rent implies that housing is developed at a higher marginal cost,
which suggests lower productivity of the housing sector in the particular tract. As Figure 1.3
shows, the model-inferred productivities are associated with higher density in each Census
tract, in line with what is expected in this framework.
In addition, pinning down Gj is crucial for the model to reproduce rents as seen in data.
As Figure 1.4 shows, if I assume that Gj is equal to one in every tract, the model does a
much worse job at matching rent rates at the tract level compared to the specification in
which I allow tract-level productivity differences for the housing sector.
Identification of Amenities
From the location choice problem faced by the workers, we have the following system of












From the data and estimation of θ, we know πj , aij , κij , wi, rj ∀i, j ∈ Ω. The objective
is to find the set of sj that solves the system above. Note that the right-hand side of


























θ. Therefore, it is sufficient to normalize λ to one and









1.4.3 Calibration of MSA-Wide Parameters
The values I pick for the parameters on the worker and consumption goods production side
come from standard sources in the literature. The value of the Cobb-Douglas parameter α
is set to 0.76, as in Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011). The value for β comes from Ahlfeldt
et al. (2015) and is set to 0.8, while η is set to 0.06 as in Ciccone and Hall (1996). The
parameters ψ and φ governing the local housing development come from Severen (2018).
Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 summarizes the parameters used in the model.
1.5 Quantitative Exercise: The Impact of Zoning Reform
Using the estimated model, I evaluate the impact of Minneapolis zoning reform on the
equilibrium prices and allocations across the metropolitan area. In my model, a zoning
reform allowing for more density is interpreted as an increase in Gj . This modeling choice
assumes that allowing for the development of more housing units in a single plot of land
reduces the cost per unit. Appendix A.1 provides a microfoundation as to why a zoning
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Figure 1.5: Model Fit
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The model is able to replicate the data well, as Figure 1.5 shows. In particular, the model
can match very well the distribution of rent values and population shares across the Twin
Cities metropolitan area. The model can also successfully replicate the wage dispersion as
seen in the data. Where the model does not do as well is at matching the upper end of the
distribution of the share of workers working at each location. Figure 1.5d shows that the
model underpredicts the share of workers in tracts where they are more highly concentrated.
1.5.1 Zoning Reform in the Model
In this section, I discuss how I incorporate the zoning reform on Gj . The Minneapolis
2040 plan rezoned the parcels previously marked as single family to allow for up to three
dwelling units. As shown in Figure 1.2, single-family units constituted the vast majority of
the residential parcels in the city. In my quantitative exercise, this reform is interpreted as
an increase in Gj for the locations j that are affected by the reform.
To perform the exercise, I match the Census tracts with Minneapolis zoning map prior to
the housing reform. The mapping between Census tracts and municipal zoning is not one-















0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Share of Lots Zoned as Single Family
Figure 1.6: Distribution of Tracts by Share of Lots Zoned as Single Family
to residential zoning, about ten percent were fully zoned as single family. Figure 1.6 plots
the histogram of the distribution of tracts by share of lots zoned as single family.
I then implement the following empirical strategy: with the estimated housing productivities
Gj , I run the following regression:
Gj =β0 + β1 × share of single-family unitsj + β2 × distj + β3 × dist2j + uj ,
where share of single-family unitsj represents the tract’s share of residential parcels previ-
ously zoned as single family, and distj is the tract j’s distance, in miles, to the most central
tract in Downtown Minneapolis. When I run this regression, the coefficient for share of
single-family units and distance squared are negative. The fact that the former is negative
serves as validation of the model.
I discipline the Gj ’s after policy in the following way: I use estimated equation above and
set the share of single-family units to the minimum that I observe in the data, which is
0.03%. Because β1 < 0 and different tracts have different shares of parcels zoned as single
family, housing productivity will increase more in the tracts with higher initial shares of
single-family units. Moreover, since the share comes from the zoning code, not de facto
development, this method ensures that the productivity increase I introduce in the model
primitives are exogenous. In addition, the inclusion of the quadratic polynomial form for
distance allows my counterfactual housing productivities to increase more in tracts that are
closer to Downtown Minneapolis. Adding this quadratic form in the construction of the
counterfactual assumes that building at a lower marginal cost is likely increase in places that






Figure 1.7: Distribution of Housing Productivity Growth in Minneapolis Before and After
The Zoning Reform
in the housing development sector is expected to grow by 9 percent in the city. Still,
productivity grows much more in some tracts, particularly the ones in the southwest region
of the city, which is populated by big single-family homes. Figure 1.7 shows the change in
the distribution of housing productivities inside Minneapolis.
1.5.2 Results
I now present the results of the quantitative exercise where I interpret the zoning reform in
Minneapolis as a change in the productivity of the housing development sector. Figure 1.8
shows the impact of upzoning on rents. Overall, rent falls about 25 percent in Minneapolis.
At the same time, population increases by about 4.6 percent in the city, as shown in Figure
1.9. Due to population reallocation, rents fall in other locations. The effects of the housing
reform on rents is heterogeneous across tracts. As Figure 1.10 shows, this is true even
for tracts outside Minneapolis. This highlights the importance of taking these general
equilibrium effects across the metropolitan area: a decrease in marginal cost of producing
housing in Minneapolis attracts workers to the city. This affects these workers’ workplace
decision, which consequently affects wages. In turn, wages and rents in other locations also
respond to this migration decision, which further generates other migration decisions in

















Figure 1.10: Impact on Rents–Tract Level
Inside Minneapolis, the change in rents is negatively correlated with the population changes,
as reflected in Figure 1.11. Many tracts experience a large inflow of residents, but still
experience a drop in rents. As Figure 1.12 suggests, the mechanism explaining this large
influx couples with rent drops in many tracts is largely explained by the negative association
between the variation in rents and the tract’s pre-policy share of lots zoned as single-family
units. Intuitively, since these tracts are now allowed to develop more housing units per
lot due to the zoning reform, they can supply more housing to residents at a substantially
lower cost. Finally, the drop in rents is also negatively associated with the tract’s distance
to Downtown Minneapolis.
Upzoning in Minneapolis also has effects on wages across the metropolitan area. Figure
1.14 presents the predicted wage changes from the baseline resulting from the upzoning.
At the aggregate level, wages rise in all counties, as well as in Minneapolis. Wages rise the
most in Hennepin County, where they rise by about 0.42 percent. As Figure 1.15 shows,
the wage increases outside Minneapolis are explained by a significant drop in the number
of agents working in those locations.
Looking at the results at the tract level allows us to inspect the mechanism more carefully.
As Figure 1.16 shows, while wages increase in most tracts, many of them experience a wage
drop. Figure 1.17 shows the reallocation of workers across the metro area. In addition,
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Figure 1.11: Relationship Between Population and Rent Changes
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Figure 1.12: Relationship Between Rent Change and Share of Single-Family Units























Figure 1.16: Impact on Wages: Tract Level
Minneapolis, located in the center of the city, to tracts in the southwest and northeast
parts of the city. Two forces are at play here. First, the parameters for the production
function show that labor demand is downward sloping. Therefore, less workers in Downtown
Minneapolis implies higher wages for the workers that keep working in the city center, even
in the presence of agglomeration effects. Finally, because many agents decide to move to
Minneapolis to reside in the areas mostly affected by to the zoning reform, as shown in
Figure 1.19, many decide to work close by since commuting costs are lower. Further, the
estimated set of location pair preferences from the Frechet distribution, aij , capture a strong
preference for workers who live in Minneapolis to work around where they live.
Finally, we can look at the effects of the housing reform on productivity across the Twin
Cities. Figure 1.20 plots the changes in productivity as a result of worker reallocation. The
majority of the productivity gains occur in the tracts outside of downtown Minneapolis,
which is highlighted in Figure 1.21. Driving this result is the increase in workers in those
locations, which induces agglomeration effects that increase productivity in those tracts.
1.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I analyzed the general equilibrium effects of upzoning in a city from the




























Figure 1.21: Impact on Productivity: Tract Level (Minneapolis)
amenities, productivities, agglomeration and congestion forces, and commuting to quantify
the impact of the policy. Local housing policies affect the equilibrium outcomes not only of
the city that implements the aforementioned policy, but also of the ones directly connected
to it in the greater urban area.
I find quantitatively important effects throughout the metropolitan area. Housing becomes
more affordable in the desired location, but this effect also spills over most of other counties
as well. At the same time, I find that upzoning is likely to attract more workers, but at
the cost of lowering wages due the increase in labor supply locally. In general, the whole
metropolitan area benefits from the policy, not just the city which implemented the policy.
The results from this chapter highlight the importance of analyzing housing reforms in the
perspective of a larger metropolitan area. They may have unexpected benefits and losses to
nearby cities that could potentially be taken into account when discussing housing policies.
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Chapter 2
Earmarked Loans and Economic
Performance in Brazil
2.1 Introduction
This chapter develops a multi-sector model to understand the impact of government credit
subsidy policies directed towards specific sectors on output per worker in the presence of
a distortionary labor tax, using the Brazilian economy’s recent experience with such pol-
icy as its quantitative experiment. The model allows for sectoral linkages in production
and imposes working capital constraints in the firms’ maximization problem. We allow for
heterogeneous input demands in the network structure, which implies that some sectors
impact others, and thus aggregate output, differently. Therefore, marginally relaxing dif-
ferent sectors’ borrowing constraint can generate different impacts on aggregate output due
to general equilibrium effects, which implies that any subsidy should take these effects into
account.
Another consequence of the credit subsidy policy is the distortion in consumption-labor
decisions by households. Because the government needs to tax labor income to subsidize
interest rates on loans, any decision to increase subsidies to a specific sector involves a
tradeoff.
Since 2010, Brazil has implemented a series of policies to foster economic growth. To
achieve this goal, the government heavily used three policy instruments: i) price freezes of
“strategic” inputs whose prices are regulated, such as the price of electricity and gasoline; ii)
tax exemptions for some sectors, in particular manufacturing industries; and iii) directed,
subsidized lending to firms and households. However, as Figure 2.1 shows, the drop in
TFP since 2010 has been sharp and consistent. This suggests that these policies may have
contributed negatively to the country’s economic performance. For instance, after growing
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7.6% in 2010, output growth slowed down to an average rate of 2.2% from 2011 to 2014.
Figure 2.1: Total Factor Productivity–Observed and Trend (2008=1)
In this chapter, we narrow down our analysis to the third instrument. Directed, subsidized
lending to specific sectors or household demographics is formally called earmarked lending.
One of the main sources of earmarked credit to firms is the Brazilian Social and Economic
Development Bank (BNDES hereafter). By earmarking credit, the government generates
substantial differences in borrowing costs across firms and sectors. Therefore, this credit
policy change in Brazil potentially had non-negligible effect on the economy. By varying
how much credit to subsidize and which sectors to focus the policy on, financial frictions
were exacerbated in some sectors and remedied in others.
To implement such a large-scale subsidy policy, the government has to generate revenues.
In Brazil, this is done mainly through a combination of labor income taxes and government
borrowing. This means that even if alleviating firms’ financial constraints has the bene-
ficial outcome of increasing output, the distortions arising from taxation can potentially
counterbalance this effect, making such policy undesirable.
The way we chose to think about this policy is by looking at how financial constraints affect
an economy with sectoral linkages. In such environment, the effect of lowering borrowing
costs in one sector propagates throughout the economy. In our model, therefore, subsidies
to a sector have effects that go beyond simply increasing production of such sector. By
increasing its production and reducing its prices, the working capital constraints of its
downstream sectors are alleviated. Indeed, since their input costs decreases, their demand
increases and production gets closer to its frictionless counterpart. This also decreases their
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prices, which consequently also alleviates their own downstream sectors’ working capital
constraints.
In general, sectors downstream of the targeted ones experience positive spillovers from the
earmarked credit policy program through general equilibrium effects. Therefore, subsidies
feature heterogeneous effects on the economy, since sectors face different financial constrains
and are not equally relevant in the production network.
There are two forces in the model associated to earmarked credit policy that could justify
aggregate TFP movements: labor market distortions and internalizing pecuniary externali-
ties. The first one comes from the need to finance subsidies with distortionary taxes, which
consequently causes misallocation of resources at the firm-level and hence a fall in aggregate
TFP. The second one comes from the positive spillover that are only (either partially or
fully) internalized by sectors via interest rate subsidies. Therefore, a government could lead
the economy to higher or lower aggregate TFP levels depending on how much and how well
distributed across sectors subsidies are.
Using Brazilian input-output tables and data on sectoral interest rates, we use the model to
understand the effect of sectoral productivity and financial frictions on aggregate produc-
tivity. Our functional form assumptions for the production sector and the financial frictions
introduced in the model allow us to write aggregate productivity that is multiplicatively
separable on sectoral productivities and borrowing costs (market interest rates and credit
subsidies). We find that the change in earmarked credit policy that occurred from 2008 to
2014 played a modest positive role in increasing GDP per worker and aggregate productiv-
ity. The observed policy was effective in raising the economy’s efficiency and hence output
per worker when compared to a policy that kept sectoral interest-rate subsidies in the levels
observed in 2008, and especially in a counterfactual economy with no government subsidies
whatsoever. Additionally, the model suggests that credit subsidies should have been even
higher than the ones observed in the data. Welfare analysis indicates that implementing
such a policy would have increased output per worker and welfare significantly.
2.1.1 Related Literature
The intervention on the credit market by the federal government was mainly to provide
firms with cheaper credit than they would in the private credit market. The policy is also
partly motivated by the idea that firms should receive subsidized credit due to financial
constraints: these firms are either very young or are part of a sector in which the social
benefit of their economic activity are bigger than the private one. As Bonomo et al. (2015)
find out, however, this credit seems to be directed towards older and larger firms, which
would likely be able to finance themselves on the private and free credit market more easily.
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Carvalho (2014) also finds that these loans occur more often to companies in regions where
local elections are coming, and the incumbent government is less likely to win by the time
the loan is approved.
Both papers cited above hint that the use of earmarked credit as a government policy may
have generated misallocation of productive resources in Brazil. The magnitude in which
such policy affected resource allocation is an open question. Following the methodology
in Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Vasconcelos (2017) finds evidence that resource misallocation
increased in Brazil from 2005 to 2011. On the other hand, Cavalcanti and Vaz (2017) find
that when a firm has access to earmarked credit in Brazil, it increases its investment and
productivity if the access is permanent, not temporary.
The literature on the link between financial frictions and misallocation is also extensive.
Gilchrist et al. (2013) look at the effect of heterogeneous borrowing cost for firms in the U.S.
financial market and find little negative aggregate effects of such heterogeneity. Midrigan
and Xu (2014) use a model in which financial frictions affect both technology adoption
between firms and dispersion in returns to capital. They find little losses in misallocation
due to such frictions. Gopinath et al. (2017) provide evidence of capital misallocation effects
of a decline in the real interest rate in Spain in the presence of financial frictions. They
find that capital inflows are misallocated toward firms with higher net worth, which aren’t
necessarily more productive.
Recently, papers such as Acemoglu et al. (2012) emphasize the role of sectoral shocks
in driving the aggregate economy. The role of small sectoral distortions in generating
substantial macroeconomic effects has also been recently explored in the literature. Baqaee
and Farhi (2017) show that the aggregate impact of a sectoral shock can be summarized into
two components: a technology shock and its effect on allocative efficiency arising from the
reallocation of resources. They show that the latter effect can be quantitatively substantial.
Justification for industrial policies are usually related to the presence of externalities (Atkin-
son and Stiglitz, 2015). Liu (2017) finds that effects of market imperfections accumulate
through backward demand linkages, that is, distortions accumulate upstream in a produc-
tion network. Therefore, a benevolent government should focus on subsidizing sectors which
are upstream from highly distorted ones to improve aggregate welfare.
Network externalities can arise from production networks in which firms face financial con-
straints (Altinoglu, 2018; Bigio and La’O, 2016; Luo, 2018). Under such circumstances,
financial constraints in one sector have effects in the rest of the economy via the intermedi-
ate demand. A distorted firm will demand less than optimal inputs from its suppliers, which
will therefore have depressed sales and will themselves demand less than optimal from their
own suppliers.
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2.2 The Role of Earmarked Credit in Brazil
In Brazil, a segment of the credit market consists of credit directed towards predetermined
sectors or activities, using resources regulated by law or discretionarily allocated by the
government. Three main entities provide funds for the lending operations. The BNDES
provides credit to private firms, either directly or through commercial banks, for their in-
vestment and working capital decisions. Housing financing for households is mostly financed
through the public bank Caixa Econômica Federal, while credit for the agricultural sector
is mainly provided by the public bank Banco do Brasil.
Since 2008, earmarked lending has steadily increased its share in total credit. Initially
implemented as a policy response to the liquidity shortage in the global economy due to
the credit crunch of 2008, it later became a government policy tool to bring cheaper credit
to firms. In particular, the creation of the Program to Sustain Investment (Programa de
Sustentação do Investimento, in Portuguese) in mid-2009 made the use of earmarked credit
to stimulate private sector’s investment a key component for the government’s long-term
economic development project. As Figure 2.2 shows, the increase in the earmarked credit
participation in the total stock of credit in Brazilian’s financial system has been steady
since 2008 until 2016, when the persistent and ever-increasing budget deficits forced the
government to wane the policy. The stock of earmarked credit rose from 11.52 percent of
GDP in January 2008 to 26.37 percent in December 2015. By the end of 2015, the amount
of earmarked credit in the Brazilian economy had reached about half the stock of credit.
As Figure 2.2 also shows, the stock of earmarked credit coming directly from BNDES, not
counting its loans made through commercial banks, also substantially increased.
The objective of the earmarked credit is to provide credit at a lower rate than the one
available in the private market. For instance, the Long Term Interest Rate (TJLP), the
benchmark rate for credit supplied by the BNDES, is set below the monetary policy rate,
and frequently reaches negative values in real terms. As Figure 2.3 shows, earmarked rates,
from the BNDES or other sources, are on average substantially lower than the ones in the
private credit market, and less volatile as well.
This difference is less striking, but still present, when we compare interest rates charged in
the earmarked and private credit market for loans with similar characteristics. We investi-
gate this by using a monthly dataset provided by the Central Bank of Brazil that contains
data on loans for firms, aggregated by sector, using the 6-digit National Classification of Eco-
nomic Activities (CNAE) code.1 Our dataset contains information on the average amount
lent, average interest rate, maturity, average value of guarantees, type of loan (earmarked
1The Brazilian National Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) has its own industry classification
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Figure 2.5: Inter-sectoral share of earmarked credit–2008-2013
or nonearmarked), and the category of the loan (working capital, fixed investments, export
credits and so on). A regression of interest rates on a dummy for whether the credit is ear-
marked, controlling for maturity, guarantees, category, year and sector dummies, indicates
that interest rates charged on earmarked credit are, on average, ten percentage points lower
than the ones in the nonearmarked segment of the credit market.
Using financial data aggregated to the 12-sector division in the Brazilian national accounts,2
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show that, even though the policy has increased its role in the Brazilian
economy, it did not increase symmetrically across sectors. In particular, Figure 2.5 shows
that the share of total earmarked credit in 2008 that was directed to each sector was fairly
different than in 2013.
Naturally, these movements could had been simply caused by changes in productivity across
sectors over time and, hence, be unrelated to the government’s policy. Nevertheless, Figure
2.6 indicates they were, to some extent, a consequence of a new targeting of earmarked
credit policy. The earmarked-to-credit-outstanding ratio in each sector has also changed
from 2008 to 2013, evidencing that the dynamics in Figure 2.5 should not only be attributed
to private sector factors.
Moreover, in order to finance the loans subsidies, the government needs to raise funds.
According to Pazarbasioglu-Dutz (2017), demand deposits, special funds, and direct lending
from the fiscal sector are the main funding sources of earmarked credit. The funding of
earmarked credit in 2015 comes from the following sources:
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Figure 2.6: Intra-sector share of earmarked credit–2008-2013
1. Savers fund about 40 percent of the earmarked credit. Funding comes from demand
and savings deposits as well as tax-exempt financial instruments from specific sectors,
such as real estate and agriculture;
2. Employees fund about 12 percent through monthly salary deductions to the Severance
Indemnity Fund (FGTS);
3. The fiscal sector funds about 48 percent through direct lending to BNDES and through
various special and constitutional funds, such as the Support Fund to the Employee
(FAT).
2.3 A Model of Sectoral Linkages with Labor Taxes
We study the impact of earmarked credit in the Brazilian economy using a simple static
general equilibrium model with sectoral linkages. The model closely related to the one
presented in Bigio and La’O (2016), and especially in Luo (2018), which includes working
capital constraints in a model with sectoral linkages and trade credit, where part of the
firms’ financing costs can be paid after production without borrowing costs. The difference
between our model and the one in Luo (2018) is the absence of trade credit, the inclusion
of government subsidies, and the introduction of labor taxes, which distorts household’s
consumption–labor supply decisions.
Even though, as Section 2.2 above discussed, the majority of resources used to finance the
earmarked credit policy in Brazil does not come from labor taxes, most of the sources of
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revenue, if not all, involve some sort of distortion in the private agents’ decision-making.
For instance, the existence of tax-exempt financial instrument generate distortion in port-
folio allocation in the financial markets. The FAT is financed mainly by taxing firms’ gross
revenues, as well as payroll taxes from non-profit organizations. Increased government
borrowing can also be thought of as a potential for distorting consumption-labor supply de-
cisions, either through the use of other distortive taxes or through higher inflation. To keep
the model simple, we choose to abstract from most of these details, leave out government
debt, and make use of a tax on wages as a way to discipline it.
The economy is composed of N sectors, indexed by i = 1, ..., N . Each sector consists of
a continuum of competitive firms. Goods are identical across firms within a sector but
differentiated across sectors. We index goods by j = 1, ..., N , with the understanding that
there is a one-to-one mapping between each sector and the good that it produces.
2.3.1 Firms











where xij denotes the intermediate input used by firm in sector i from sector j; `i represents
the amount of labor input used by the firm i, and zi is a sector-specific productivity measure.
We assume
∑N
j=1 ωij = 1 for all i.
There exists a working capital requirement on labor and intermediate inputs. Firms need
to borrow in order to pay for their input cost at the beginning of each production period.
We assume a small open economy in which firms obtain credit from the rest of the world
with a fixed interest rate R, plus an idiosyncratic risk ei. Policymakers can subsidize the
loan on each unit of the credit obtained by the firm in the amount si. In this case, the
borrowing fee of the firm becomes Ri = R+ ei − si.
The output of sector i can be used as an intermediate input for other sectors, xji, as well
as for final consumption, which we denote ci. Due to the financial consraint, the price the
firm sells its goods to other firms, pji, is not the same as the price it sells to households, pi.























The preferences of the representative household are given by:






where ` denotes labor and c the household’s final consumption basket. The final consump-








where the parameter νj ∈ [0, 1] is the household’s expenditure share on good j. If the house-
hold does not consume good j, then νj = 0. Without loss of generality we set
∑N
j=1 νj = 1.
The budget constraint of the household is given by:




where the left hand side is total expenditure and the right hand side includes the after-tax
wage income of the household and dividends from owning all of the firms. P is the price
level, given by P ≡ Πipνii , which comes from the expenditure minimization problem.
2.3.3 Government
The government taxes labor in order to finance their sectoral loan subsidy policy. We
assume it can not borrow in order to finance its expenditures. Therefore, the government






(pijxij − pjixji) + w`i
 = τw`
2.3.4 Market clearing
The output of any given sector may be either consumed by the household or used by other
sectors as an input to production. Commodity market clearing for each good i is thus given
by:
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Similarly, labor market clearing satisfies
∑N
i=1 `i = `.
2.3.5 Equilibrium
Given the environment described above, the equilibrium in this model is defined as follows.
Definition 2 Given the sector-specific interest rate and subsidy, (Ri, si)
N
i=1, a competitive
equilibrium consists of a vector of commodity prices, (pi)
N
i=1, a consumption bundle, (ci)
N
i=1,








1. the household and firms are at their respective optima;
2. prices and wages clear the commodity and labor markets.
2.4 Financial Frictions and Aggregate Distortions
Given the amount of labor supplied by the household `, Proposition 1 below characterizes
the equilibrium aggregate value added, tax rate, wages and sectoral prices.
Proposition 1 Let ◦ and  denote the Hadamard (entrywise) product and division, re-
spectively. Define the vectors s ≡ [s1 . . . sN ]′, R ≡ [R1 . . . RN ]′, z ≡ [z1 . . . zN ]′, α ≡
[α1 . . . αN ]




ij and Ω and Λ
be matrices with entries Ωij = (1−αi)ωij and Λij = Ri/Rj, respectively. In addition, define
β ≡ (I − Ω′)−1ν.
The aggregate production function of this economy is linear in labor, and given by
GDP (z,R, s) = A(z)µ(R, s)`, (2.1)


















1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.
The endogenous tax rate that is consistent with the government policy s is given by
τ =
((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
. (2.2)
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The log of the wage rate is given by
logw = β′ [log Θ + log z− (I − Ω) log R] . (2.3)
Aggregate price level is normalized to one (P = 1). The log of the sectoral price vector p is
given by
log p = [I − (I − Ω)−1αβ′(I − Ω)] log R− (I − Ω)−1(I −αβ′)(log Θ + log z). (2.4)
2.4.1 The Efficiency Wedge
Proposition 1 shows that the production function aggregates into one that is linear on
labor. This aggregate output function is similar from the one in Luo (2018) and in Bigio
and La’O (2016). The difference between ours and the latter is our assumption of constant
returns to scale. The aggregate production function contains an aggregate TFP that can
be decomposed into two terms–one that is a function of sectoral productivity, A(z), and
one that depends on the distribution of interest rate spreads and government subsidies,
µ(R, s). The former is the common aggregation of sectoral productivity, while the latter is
the efficiency wedge, i.e., the effect of sectoral distortions on aggregate productivity.
The Impact of a Sectoral Productivity Shock on Aggregate TFP
It’s easier to see how aggregate TFP moves due to a sectoral productivity shock by taking
logs on A(z) and using the definition of β:
logA(z) = (I − Ω′)−1ν(log Θ + log z).
The term (I − Ω′)−1 is called the Leontief Inverse matrix. It encapsulates the infinite
impact a sectoral productivity shock has in the economic network: a positive productivity
shock in sector i simultaneously decreases the sector’s price and increases its output. This
in turns induces sectors that demand i’s intermediate good to purchase more from this
sector, increasing their production as well as decreasing their prices. These effects propagate
through the economic network, and the magnitude of this effects depends on the network
structure in Ω.
The Impact of Government Subsidies on Aggregate TFP
To build intuition understand the impact of government subsidies on aggregate productivity,
we split the discussion in three parts.
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The impact of borrowing costs on TFP. Assume no subsidies and that borrowing
costs are equal across sectors and R > 1. It can be shown that α′β = 1, so therefore the
efficiency wedge can be expressed as follows:
logµ(R, s) = − logR.
In this case, the effect of borrowing costs on aggregate productivity is represented by a
downward shift in the aggregate production function.
The impact of dispersions in borrowing costs on TFP. Assume no subsidies, but
now borrowing costs are allowed to vary across sectors. The efficiency wedge can be ex-
pressed as follows:

















= −(β + Ω′β)′ log R
= −β′(I + Ω) log R.
In this setting, the network structure of the economy plays a role in shifting the aggregate
TFP downwards–a higher borrowing cost in sector i distorts the first-order condition for in-
termediate goods in all sectors that demand i’s output. This creates resource misallocation,
which is amplified through the network structure of the economy.
The impact of borrowing costs subsidies on TFP. When we add government sub-
sidies to borrowing costs, the efficiency wedge can be expressed as follows:
logµ(R, s) =− β′(I + Ω) log R
− log
(
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)
(





where 1 is a vector of ones and the fact that Λ can be written as (R1′) ◦ (1R′).
Note that, in our definition, Ri = R + ei − si. Thus, it’s hard to make comparative
statics using the expression above. Nevertheless, we can see from above that if the term
((sR)′ − s′(Ω  (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ [(R1′) ◦ (1R′)])−1 ν is positive, government subsidies
have deleterious effects on aggregate productivity.
To think about how government subsidies affect the economy’s aggregate productivity, start
by assuming initially that there are no subsidies to borrowing costs, so that si = 0 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and thus τ = 0. Denote the vector of the log of the sectors’ borrowing costs
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as log R0. A necessary and sufficient condition for a given vector of sectoral subsidies s to
improve aggregate TFP is that logµ(R, s)− logµ(R0,0) > 0, or
− β′(I + Ω)(log R− log R0)
− log
(
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)
(





2.4.2 The Absence of the Labor Wedge
Now, we close the model using the household’s optimality condition to derive the labor











Combining both, we get
(1− τ`(s,R))A(z)µ(R, s) = (1− τ)w.
Plugging in the functional forms for the tax rate, wages, sectoral productivity and the
efficiency wedge, we get the following result.
Proposition 2 In equilibrium, the economy’s aggregate labor wedge is always equal one.
That is, τ`(s,R) = 0.
The reason why our model does not contain the labor wedge rests solely on the fact that
we are not allowing the interest-rate spread ei to return to the household as a lump-sum
transfer. Here, the revenue generated from those spreads are simply thrown into the ocean.
In this setting, because the sectoral production function is constant returns to scale and
all the distortions are incorporated in the after-tax wage rate, the household has no other
source of income to finance consumption. In Appendix B, we derive the labor wedge for the
case in which the revenue generated from the interest-rate spreads are rebated back to the
consumer. In such setting, both the efficiency wedge and the tax rate change compared to
our baseline model.
2.4.3 Equilibrium path
Starting from the labor wedge definition, we get
`1+ϕ = (1− τ`(s,R))c1−σ.
Given that c(z,R, s) = A(z)µ(R, s)`, we take logs and arrive at the following lemma:
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Lemma 3 Given sectoral productivity, efficiency and labor wedges, equilibrium aggregate
consumption and labor supply are given by
log `(R, s) =
1− σ
σ + ϕ




log c(R, s) =
1 + ϕ
σ + ϕ




2.4.4 Intuition Behind the Model
In the model, the government needs to raise funds in order to subsidize firms via distor-
tionary labor taxes. Whenever a firm’s borrowing costs are subsidized, it increases its input
demand and, consequently, its output. By supplying more goods, this sector’s price is re-
duced. Therefore, the subsidy works as if it was alleviating the borrowing constraint of
firms in all the downstream sectors from the original firm: all its customers purchases their
intermediate goods at lower prices. Consequently, all downstream sectors produce more and
sell their output at lower prices, allowing their own downstream sectors to purchase more
intermediate goods, produce more, and sell their output at lower prices. This effect goes
on forever, which implies that total output in this economy increases due to lower interest
rates.
Therefore, this multi-sector economy with borrowing constraints features externalities that
are only internalized with government subsidizes. Subsidy will only be beneficial to the
economy when the spillover of the targeted sector towards its downstream sectors compen-
sates the labor market distortion.
2.5 Calibration
We use annual data on National Accounts provided by the Brazilian Institute of Geography
and Statistics (IBGE), in particular their Use tables, disaggregated at 12 industries for the
years 2000-2015. The industries are: Agriculture, Extraction Industries, Manufacturing,
Utilities, Construction, Retail, Transportation and Storage, ICT, Financial Services and
Insurance, Real Estate, Other Services and Public Administration. Because we assume
sectors borrow from the international financial markets, we exclude Financial Services and
Insurance from our quantitative exercise. For each year, this table identifies sector i’s uses
(expenditures) of goods produced by sector j, the empirical analogue of pijxij . Final use
of sector i net of gross fixed capital formation and inventories is the empirical analogue of
pici. For the empirical analogue of w`i, we add to sector i’s labor compensation half of the
sector’s gross mixed income. This is motivated by the fact that this item in the national
accounts includes components of both labor and capital income. We take the agnostic
stance of assigning assigning half of such income to labor.
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2.5.1 Input shares
Due to the Cobb-Douglas production function of intermediate goods and the Cobb-Douglas
final goods aggregator, this data is sufficient for computing the labor shares, αi, the inter-
mediate inputs shares, ωij , and the consumption shares, νi. Therefore, we compute these













We also retrieve a sector-specific price index from the Make tables, since they are available in
current prices as well as previous-year prices. We observe, therefore, the empirical analogue
of (pij), which allows us to recover each sectors’ intermediate input demand (xij) and output
(yi). IBGE also reports the number of employers in each sector, which is the empirical









We chose to let parameters vary by year instead of taking the yearly average due to the
nature of the Cobb-Douglas function. The value of intermediate demand from some sectors
is zero in some years. If the parameters ωij are constant, in the years where xij takes the






would take the value of zero as well.
Nevertheless, they are fairly stable. Figure 2.7 depicts the sectoral labor share across the
years.
2.5.2 Sectoral subsidies
The Central Bank of Brazil manages a loan-level database called Credit Information System
(SIC) that consists of all loans above R$5,000 (during the 2008-2015 period, its dollar-
equivalent nominal value was always in the $1,250–3,000 range). It provides information
on loan amount, maturity, collateral value, interest rate, industry, and category (project
financing, vehicle financing, bill discounting, etc). Our data set is monthly and spans from
the years 2004 to 2018. Markedly, it also discriminates earmarked from non-earmarked
loans. Therefore, our sample offers a good representation of the entire Brazilian economy,
suitable for analyzing earmarked credit policy.
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Figure 2.7: Labor share (αi) by sector
We compute the sum of world interest rate plus idiosyncratic risk, R+ ei, as the sector i’s
average real interest rate of non-earmarked loans from this database. Analogously, we use
the sector i’s average real interest rate of earmarked loans as the sum of world interest rate
plus idiosyncratic risk minus subsidy rate, R + ei − ςi. Sector i’s subsidy rate, ςi, is then
calculated as the difference between these two objects. We also extract, for each sector i,
the share of total loans that are earmarked, φi, directly from the data. We use these two
objects to compute the subsidy by each unit of credit to sector i as si = φiςi.
In our quantitative exercise, we choose to focus on the transition between the years 2008 and
2013. We chose 2008 since it’s the last year before the government started using earmarked
lending as a countercyclical measure to deal with the 2008 financial crisis. In 2014, the
presidential election took place, and the economy started to experience a slowdown. The
latter may have been affected by other factors outside our model, which is why we decided to
use 2013 instead of 2014. Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for the interest rate spread
and share of earmarked credit in the eleven sectors. The table shows that, on average,
the reduction in interest rate per sector from the earmarked lending decreases from 2008
to 2013, while the share of earmarked lending in each sector significantly increased. A
reason why the interest rate spread is smaller in 2013 than in 2008 on average is potentially
explained by the decrease in the average lending rate in Brazil due to monetary easing in
Brazil and in the world: the rate was on average 47.25% in 2008, and 27.39% in 2013.
2.6 Quantitative Exercises
This section presents the main quantitative findings of the chapter. We first investigate
the role of the dynamics of sectoral productivity to aggregate productivity. Next, we use
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Table 2.1: Productivity and Credit Data by Sector
Interest rate Share of earmarked
spread (p.p.) credit (%)
Sector 2008 2013 2008 2013
Agriculture 5.27 4.68 41.64 48.27
Extraction Industries 3.26 5.22 57.25 47.42
Manufacturing 4.48 3.76 15.22 20.56
Utilities -1.03 2.02 46.09 72.95
Construction 11.03 10.59 30.36 34.08
Retail 4.78 4.95 9.24 15.87
Transportation & Storage 11.7 13.09 45.56 67.39
ICT 13.85 -6.14 3.96 21.14
Real Estate 6.22 9.05 11.57 16.58
Other Services 13.77 4.25 27.57 28.39
Public Administration 16.08 13.03 4.67 25.77
Note: The interest rate spread, ςi, represents the difference, in percentage points, between the interest
rates charged for nonearmarked and earmarked loans in sector i. The share of earmarked credit, φi,
represents the share or earmarked loans in sector i in the given year.
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the model to assess the optimal vector of sector subsidies given exogenous sector-specific
interest rates observed in the data, as well as considering the counterfactual policy of not
intervening in the credit markets through subsidy, consequently not taxing labor income.
2.6.1 Decomposing aggregate productivity
Using equation (2.1), we can infer the contribution of the sectoral productivity component
of TFP to aggregate productivity. The left panel of Figure 2.8 plots the function A(zt) for
years 2000 to 2015. The values were normalized so that A(z2008) = 1. The figure shows a
productivity slowdown between the years 2000 and 2003, followed by a recovery from 2004
to 2008. After the Great Recession in the United States in 2008, there was a sharp drop of
more than six percent in the sectoral productivity component of TFP in 2009, followed by
a quick recovery in 2010 and 2011. By the latter year, the sectoral productivity component
of TFP was about four percent higher than in 2008. From 2012 onwards, this component of
aggregate productivity starts to fall considerably. In 2015, it was about eight percent lower
than in 2008.
We can use equation (2.1) to decompose the dynamics of the efficiency wedge as well. The
right panel of Figure 2.8 plots the function µ(Rt, st) for years 2004 to 2015. we observe
that it contributed positively to aggregate TFP growth between 2004 and 2008. In 2009, it
contributed negatively, just as the sectoral productivity component. From 2010 to 2012, it
again contributed to productivity growth, contributing negatively afterwards.
If we apply a comparative statics exercise, analyzing the contribution of each component to
GDP per worker growth from 2008 to 2013, the year before the presidential elections, the
model indicates that aggregate TFP grew 0.73% due to sectoral productivity growth, and
13.48% due to the efficiency wedge. This implies that factors affecting the behavior of each
sector’s productivity were much more important to explain why Brazil did not grow as fast
after recovering from the spillovers of the Great Recession in the United States.
From 2013 onwards, both the sectoral productivity component and the efficiency wedge
were responsible for a sharp drop in aggregate productivity. In particular, the efficiency
wedge dropped as much as forty percent from 2013 to 2014. This can be partly explained
by the increase in world interest rates.3 In the next section, we will investigate whether the
government policy was responsible for such a sharp drop in this component of TFP.
2.6.2 Optimal interest rate subsidy policy
In this section, we use the optimal consumption and labor derived from the household
optimality conditions, (2.5) and (2.6), to choose the vector of government subsidies that
3For instance, five-year U.S. Treasury bonds increased half a percentage point.
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(a) Sectoral productivity (b) Efficiency wedge
Figure 2.8: Contributions to aggregate productivity (2008=1)
maximizes household utility. For this exercise, we choose σ = 2 and ϕ = 0.5, common
values in the business cycle literature.
Figure 2.9 compares the observed subsidy policy to the optimal one for the years 2008,
2010 and 2013 and is the most important finding in this chapter. Each dot represents the
observed and optimal subsidy for a single sector in one given year We find that, through
the lens of our model, the optimal subsidy policy should generally be much higher than the
one observed in the data. In general, lower subsidies were required for 2013 when compared
to 2008, even though they should have been substantially higher than the actual policy in
both years. This is in line with the discussion in Section 5.2. The decrease in the average
lending rate in Brazil due to monetary easing in Brazil and in the world required a less
aggressive subsidy policy from the government.
Next, we analyze overall welfare gains of implementing the optimal policy from 2008 to
2013. Figure 2.10 plots the results. We find that applying the optimal policy improves
welfare substantially, especially between 2008 and 2009. In particular, would have been
about twenty five percent higher in 2009 if the optimal policy was implemented compared
to the actual policy.
Figures 2.11 and 2.12 plot the behavior of the efficiency wedge and GDP per worker. Both
measures would be at least twenty percent higher than the actual observed value in 2008 in
every year of the sample. The optimal policy would have offset the negative contribution of
the sectoral productivity and the efficiency wedge components of TFP more substantially.
We also perform two counterfactuals: fixing the government policy to the one observed
in 2008, as well as removing all sectoral subsidies. Figure 2.10 presents these results.
In terms of welfare gains, both policies would have been welfare-reducing, especially the
one where the government removes all sectoral subsidies. Focusing on freezing the policy
48
Figure 2.9: Optimal vs. observed policies
Figure 2.10: Welfare relative to actual policy
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Figure 2.11: Efficiency wedge Figure 2.12: GDP per worker
to 2008 levels, Figures 2.11 and 2.12 indicate that the behavior of the efficiency wedge
and output per worker would have been roughly similar to the data from 2004 to 2015.
The changes in credit policy from 2008 onwards were not as relevant as the behavior of
sectoral productivities to explain the behavior of aggregate TFP. Nevertheless, the policy
implemented by the government contributed to offset the negative effects of interest rate
shocks on the efficiency wedge.
2.7 Conclusion and Directions for Further Research
Under the lens of our model, the change in earmarked credit policy that occurred from 2008
to 2014 played a positive, albeit modest, role in the economy in terms of GDP per worker.
The observed policy was effective in raising the economy’s efficiency and hence output per
worker when compared to a policy that kept sectoral interest-rate subsidies in the levels
observed in 2008, and especially in a counterfactual economy with no government subsidies
whatsoever. More importantly, the model suggests that the government should have pro-
vided sectors with even more subsidies than the ones observed in the data. Implementing
such a policy would have increased output per worker and welfare significantly.
A potential model is one in which the government can finance its credit policy not only
by taxing labor, but also by borrowing. In this setting, expanding earmarked loans may
increase the government’s default risk. If the idiosyncratic borrowing cost faced by each sec-
tor is correlated with the government’s, sharp increases in earmarked credit policy force the
government to increase both labor taxes and debt, which imposes not only labor distortions
but also higher borrowing costs for non-earmarked loans.
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Even though our current model is not appropriate for addressing such channel, it does
illustrate one of our next steps. To our knowledge, sovereign default risk was never used
in a general equilibrium model for modeling the costs of industrial policies. Or, similarly,
earmarked loans in an economy with sectoral linkages were never used to explicitly model
rolling over debt costs.
Another challenge to our theoretical framework and therefore our conclusions in this chap-
ter is the absence of capital as a factor of production. Because we do not have sectoral
data on fixed assets from the national accounts, it’s not feasible to introduce capital ac-
cumulation to the current setting. Since a substantial share of the earmarked loans were
directed towards long-term investments, omitting the investment channel in our analysis
may have significantly affected our conclusions. One potential solution is to use the Annual
Survey of Industry (PIA). Conducted by the IBGE, it is a yearly census of the Brazilian
manufacturing sector. This data set covers all firms in the manufacturing and extractive
industries, including firm-level data on labor compensation, capital expenditures, fixed as-
sets and purchases of intermediate goods. Even though it would restrict the analysis to a
subset of sectors of the Brazilian economy, the potential gains of providing more detailed
analysis of the role of earmarked credit in the firms’ investment decisions could therefore
shed some light in the role of the government policy in capital (mis)allocation across these
sectors.
Additionally, our current analysis is silent about the effect of this policy on industry con-
centration. In Section 2.6.1, we provided evidence that the decline in sectoral productivity
was a relevant driver of the slowdown in aggregate TFP. It is possible that assuming a
representative firm in each sector may be hiding interesting intra-sector firm dynamics. As
shown by Bonomo et al. (2015), inside each industrial sector, earmarked loans were directed
towards older and bigger firms. The government policy may be leading to deleterious mar-
ket concentration by allocating cheaper capital to bigger, unproductive firms, while forcing
younger and productive firms to exit the market, thus lowering average productivity by sec-
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Tract-Level Housing Productivity and Zoning Reform
Suppose there’s a developer that wants to build in a parcel with land size Li in location
j. They combine Li with materials Mi to create total square footage in the parcel, with
encompasses both floorspace by unit and number of units in the parcel. Developer chooses
both ui, the number of units in the parcel, and ai, floorspace by unit. The parcel-level
























imizing with the respect to M , the developer then picks u ∈ 0, 1, . . . , u that maximizes
profits. Denote this u as u∗(u). The upper bound, u, is dictated by local zoning laws.
Similarly, suppose there is a representative developer at the tract level, with productivity





































If we want to use the aggregate housing production function to represent the sum of housing
















That is, tract-level productivity is the land-weighed sum of lot-level productivity and opti-
mal unit choice. For the counterfactual exercise presented in the main body of the text to
make sense conceptually, it is sufficient that the choice of u∗(upre) < u
∗(upost), where upre
is the upper bound on development before the zoning reform and upost is the upper bound
after the zoning reform. In such case, an increase in number of units per lot is equivalent
to a productivity increase in the tract level.
A.2 Parameters
Parameter Value Source
α 0.76 Davis and Ortalo-Magne (2011)
β 0.8 Ahlfeldt et al. (2015)
η 0.06 Ciccone and Hall (1996)
φ 0.3 Severen (2018)
ψ 6.7 Severen (2018)
θ 6.99 Regression
ι 0.06 Owens III et al. (2020)
Table A.1: Parameter Values
A.3 Further Model Derivations
A.3.1 Worker’s Location Choice
Before exploring the problem, it is convenient to define the following probability:
Gij(v) = Pr(V̂ij ≤ v).
Let ψij ≡ aijV θij . Using the definition of counterfactual indirect utility above and the






















































From the law of large numbers, the fraction of workers living in location j and working in
























































The equation above is a gravity equation for commuting, describing overall patterns of
workers’ workplace and location choices. It shows that the fraction of the population living
in j and working in i is increasing in the location taste shock aij , wages paid in i, and
amenities in j. Similarly, the share of workers is decreasing in costly it is to commute
between the pair ij, how high are residential taxes in j, and rent (rj). Sensitivity to these
variables depend on shape parameter θ of location taste











































Housing Demand Housing demand for residents in j commuting to i is given by






i∈Ω πi|jwi. Aggregating across working neighborhoods, we get the total housing
demand, Hdj :























j = ιMj + pjLj
ι
(1− φ)















































, ψ ≡ φ× ψ.
60
A.3.3 Welfare
Using similar arguments from the section on worker’s location choice, the probability of

































































































1. Guess array V0;



















































8. Check if ||V1 − V0|| < 10−6. Stop if true. If not, set V0new = .25V1 + .75V0old.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
We begin by first proving the following Lemma:
Lemma 4 Given sectoral prices and wages, the firm i’s optimality condition for output,




pjxij for all j, and (B.1)
αipiyi = Riw`i. (B.2)
In addition, given sectoral prices and wages, the firm i’s cost function for a given output
level is given by



































(1− αi)ωijpiyi = Ripijxij
αipiyi = Riw`i.
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In order for it not to be profitable for the firm to focus on selling their goods either to firms
or to households, the marginal revenues have to be equal: pi = Ripji. Thus, we can rewrite



































, j 6= k.
























































































































































































































Normalize P ≡ Πipνii = 1. Let gi ≡ piyi. Then, using (B.1),























































(1− αN )ωN1 (1− αN )ωN2 . . . (1− αN )ωNN















. . . RNRN
 .
Let g ≡ [g1 . . . gN ]′ and ν ≡ [ν1 . . . νN ]′. Then, from the algebra above:
g = νc+ (Ω′ ◦ Λ)g
⇒ g =
(

































Define β ≡ (I − Ω′)−1ν, which is a centrality measure. It can be shown that
∑
i αiβi = 1.























pνii = P = 1.
We can write the wage in the economy as a function of labor shares, {αi}, intermediate




































Let s ≡ [s1 . . . sN ]′ and R ≡ [R1 . . . RN ]′. Denote  as the Hadamard division and 1 as a











































































= ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)g.
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Using it in the household’s budget constraint,
c = (1− τ)w`
= w`− ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)g
= w`− ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)
(
I − Ω′ ◦ Λ
)−1
νc.
Let z ≡ [z1 . . . zN ]′. Through market clearing, we can express GDP as a function of total
labor supply, `, sectoral productivities {zi}, sectoral interest rates {Ri}, sectoral subsidies
{si}, and exogenous parameters:















1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
`.
Using this result in the household’s budget constraint, we can write the tax rate τ as
τ =
((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.
From the sector’s zero-profit condition, we take logs:
log pi = −(log Θi + log zi) + αi(logw + logRi) +
N∑
j=1
(1− αi)ωij (log pj + logRi − logRj)
= −(log Θi + log zi) + logRi + αi logw +
N∑
j=1
(1− αi)ωij (log pj − logRj)
Let p ≡ [p1 . . . pN ]′, Θ ≡ [Θ1 . . . ΘN ]′ and α ≡ [α1 . . . αN ]′. Then, we can write the
system as
log p = −(log Θ + log z) + log R + α logw + Ω(log p− log R).
Which yields
log p = log R + (I − Ω)−1 [α logw − (log Θ + log z)] .





log Θi + log zi − αi logRi − (1− αi) N∑
j=1










= β′ [log Θ + log z− (I − Ω) log R]
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We can then solve for the price vector:
log p = log R + (I − Ω)−1
{
αβ′ [log Θ + log z− (I − Ω)R]− (log Θ + log z)
}
= log R− (I − Ω)−1(I −αβ′)(log Θ + log z)− (I − Ω)−1αβ′(I − Ω)R
= [I − (I − Ω)−1αβ′(I − Ω)] log R− (I − Ω)−1(I −αβ′)(log Θ + log z)
Proof of Proposition 2
















The expression 1− τ can be written as
1− τ = 1
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.
Using the results from Proposition 1, the equivalence results becomes
1− τ`
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
=
1
1 + ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.
which implies that 1− τ` = 1 and thus τ` = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1
Starting from the labor wedge definition, we get
`1+ϕ = (1− τ`(s,R))c1−σ.
Given that c(z,R, s) = A(z)µ(R, s)`, we take logs










log c = logA(z) + log µ(R, s)
1− σ
σ + ϕ












B.2 Deriving the lump-sum transfers to consumers
If the idiosyncratic borrowing cost ei is transfered lump-sum to the consumer instead of







(pijxij − pjixji) + w`i
 .




(Ri + si − 1)
∑
j




































































= [((R + s− 1)R)′ − (R + s− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′]g,
where 1 is a vector where all entries equal one. Using it in the household’s budget constraint,
c = (1− τ)w`+ Ψ
= w`− ((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′)g + [((R + s− 1)R)′ − (R + s− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′]g
= w`+ [((R− 1)R)′ − (R− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′]g
= w`+ [((R− 1)R)′ − (R− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′]
(
I − Ω′ ◦ Λ
)−1
νc.
The expression for GDP is as follows















1− [((R− 1)R)′ − (R− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′] (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
`.
Using this result in the household’s budget constraint, we can write the tax rate τ as
τ =
((sR)′ − s′(Ω (R1′))′) (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
1− [((R− 1)R)′ − (R− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′] (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.
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1− [((R− 1)R)′ − (R− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′] (I − Ω′ ◦ Λ)−1 ν
.





(1− τ`) = 1− [((R + s− 1)R)′ − (R + s− 1)′(Ω (R1′))′]
(
I − Ω′ ◦ Λ
)−1
ν.
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